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I.

Intro

The problem the United States health care industry faces today is one of
fragmentation. The Institute of Medicine has pointed out that this problem , specifically, is
jeopardizing the lives and well-being of many Americans as well as contributing to the
excessive level and unsustainable growth rate of expenditures on health care.

1

Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are designed to promote care coordination,
higher quality, and lower costs. 2 ACOs are groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health
care providers who come together voluntarily as a group to give coordinated high quality
care to their Medicare patients. 3 The goal of coordinated care is to ensure that patients,
1

Harvard Law School, Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics, Our Fragmented Health Care
System: Causes and Solutions (Jun. 13-14, 2008) http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/petrieflom/workshops_conferences/Conferences/Fragmentation/ProgramMay29.pdf; also see Auerbach DI and
Kellermann AL, A Decade of Health Care Cost Growth Has Wiped Out Real Income Gains
for an Average U.S. Family, Health Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 9, September 2011 (In the ten-year period between

1999 and 2009, U.S. health care spending nearly doubled, climbing from $1.3 trillion to $2.5 trillion. In
2009, while the rest of the U.S. economy plunged into recession and millions lost their jobs, health care
costs grew by 4 percent. As a result, the percentage of our nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) devoted
to health care reached 17.6 percent, up from 13.8 percent only ten years earlier. Although these numbers
are striking, they do not easily translate into figures that are meaningful to individual Americans.)
2

Maulik Joshi, American Hospital Association, Accountable Care Organizations AHA Research Synthesis
Report, American Hospital Association Committee on Research, (June 10) available at
http://www.hret.org/accountable/resources/ACO-Synthesis-Report.pdf
3
See Id.; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Accountable Care Organizations (Last modified 04/05/2012)
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/index.html?redirect=/ACO/ (The ACO
concept envisions multiple providers assuming joint accountability for improving health care quality and slowing
the growth of health care costs. The concept was also included in national health care reform legislation as one of
several demonstration programs to be administered by Medicare (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010).
However, ACOs described in health reform legislation are operationally different from other ACO models. The role
of ACOs in integrating and aligning provider incentives in care delivery requires participating organizations to
possess certain key competencies.)
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especially the chronically ill, get the appropriate care while avoiding unnecessary
duplication of services and preventing medical errors. This is a shift from the old health
care model, fee for service, which took into account the value or volume of referrals
generated between the parties4, towards a joint cooperation model amongst providers. As
long as the group meets defined quality benchmarks, its providers can share in any
financial rewards that result from cost savings. Most importantly, the providers also share
in the collective risk of penalties for poor performance and therefore have an incentive to
control the quality of care that could help shape health care delivery costs. In order for the
ACO model to flourish, waivers must be put in place. One of the major restraints with the
old model of clinical integration was the tendency to fall into the trap of either overutilization, under-utilization (i.e., the withholding of necessary items or services), or
referrals that are based on considerations other than what might be in the best interest of
the patient. 5 ACOs provide potential solutions to fragmentation. ACOs are intended to
achieve greater coordination of care by linking together physician practices and hospitals
that will be financially rewarded if they improve quality while at the same time lowering
costs. Recent trends show an increase in health care marketplace consolidation. 6

4

Claire Turcotte and Bryn Hunt, OIG Issues One Negative and One Favorable Advisory Opinion on Hospital-Based
Arrangements, Bricker and Eckler Publications (Novemeber 29, 2010) available at
http://www.bricker.com/publications-and-resources/publications-and-resources-details.aspx?publicationid=2069
5
American Medical Association, Trend watch: Clinical Integration—Key to Real Reform, 10 (February,2010)
available at http://www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/10feb-clinicinteg.pdf As apply to Medicare and Medicaid
patients there is an aimed at curbing arrangements that involve financial incentives to providers that could result in
either over-utilization, under-utilization (i.e., the withholding of necessary items or services), or referrals that are
based on considerations other than what might be in the best interest of the patient. While well intended, statutes are
either broadly written or interpreted so as to also prohibit – or create uncertainties about – a broad range of benign
arrangements that could better align hospitals and physicians and pose little or no potential risk of abuse.
6
America’s Health Insurance Plan Coverage, Fact Check: Provider Consolidation Drives Up Prices (February 17,
2012), http://www.ahipcoverage.com/2012/02/17/fact-check-provider-consolidation-drives-up-prices/ An analysis of

2

When insurers, hospitals and physician practices consolidate, however, anticompetitive arrangements result, leading to a decrease in cost control measures. These
outcomes have potential to violate federal laws established in the Sherman Act, Clayton act
and Federal Trade Commission Act. 7 Despite the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
Department of Justice (DOJ) developing safe harbors in order to provide clearance for
providers to collaborate without running afoul of federal anti-trust laws, the proposed antitrust enforcement declined to address state anti-trust concerns.
This paper will specifically deal with the issues concerning ACOs role in antitrust
violations and will present the argument that while federal safe harbors alone may initially
prove to be sufficient protection at the inception of ACOs, their longevity at effectiveness
is uncertain. The lack of preemption within Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA), provides state antitrust enforcement the power to ensure the greatest level of
protection.

Part II will explain the problem of fragmentation; describe the formation,

requirements, and objectives of ACOs.

This section will also provide a scenario analysis

of most ideal illustration of clinical integration. Part III will focus how integration of

provider consolidation found that “in 2009, hospital ownership was ‘highly concentrated’ in over 80% of the 335”
areas studied. Also See Cory Capps ,PhD and David Dranove, PhD, Market Concentration of Hospitals, (June
2011) available at http://www.ahipcoverage.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/ACOs-Cory-Capps-Hospital-MarketConsolidation-Final.pdf
7
Caswell O. Hobbs, FTC Enforcement: Antitrust Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices, Corporate Law and
Practice Handbook Series, 524 PLI/Corp 437, PLI Order No. B4-6755 (May 1, 1986) (Sherman Act prohibits
contracts, combinations and conspiracies which unreasonably restrain competition. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18,
prohibits mergers and acquisitions which may lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 18(a), known as the “Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,” requires parties to certain
mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and corporate and non-corporate formations to notify the FTC and DOJ about
the transaction before the transaction closes. FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, prohibits unfair methods of competition. The
FTC Act can also be used to challenge merger which are not technically covered under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966). Only the FTC has jurisdiction to sue under the FTC Act.

3

providers could lead to arrangements that are centered around price fixing and joint
negotiations. In addition, the worst case scenario is discussed and the viability of such a
scenario to come to fruition. Part IV will show how Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Health and Human Services (HHS) plan to provide
antitrust clearance to protect ACOs against any federal suits under existing antitrust laws.
These exceptions will be made to those ACOs that are productive, competitive and have
become fully integrated while operating in the commercial market. Part V examines the
dynamic scenario, looking forward to the years following the initial implementation of
ACOs. The theory of what might be helpful and effective at one point in time (during the
initial phase of inception of ACOs), may not be the solution for the long term. The risk that
federally approved ACOs can gain enormous market power despite the parameters under
antitrust clearance can influence the overall efficiency.

Lastly, Part V I addresses the

possibility of state and private lawsuits against dominant ACOs and explains why such
actions provide a necessary second level of defense for patients when ACOs become
market dominate.
II.

Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)
A. Fragmentation
Fragmentation comprises the core of the ineffectiveness in our increasingly frantic

efforts to foster improvement to a health care system which has produced unsustainable
cost increases, poor quality, and inequalities. 8

The underlying cause in a fragmented

system is the patients and families navigating across different providers and care settings.
8

Elhauge ed., The Fragmentation in US. Health Care: Cases and Solutions, Oxford (Jan. 15, 2010)
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/Elhauge%20The%20Fragmentation%20of%20US%20Healt
h%20Care%20--%20Introductory%20Chpt.pdf
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This experience fosters frustrating and dangerous patient experiences due to poor
communication and lack of clear accountability.9 The inadequacy of accountability has
lead to medical errors, waste of resources, and duplication of services; ultimately highcost.10 This fragmentation is found on the national, state, community, and practice levels.
Health spending has soared over the past decades from a National health expenditure of
$27.1 billion in 1960 to today over $2.6 trillion.11

Lack of competition created

supracompetitive profits12, an escalating number of uninsured, an epidemic of deceptive
and fraudulent conduct, and rapidly escalating costs. Over 47 million Americans are now
uninsured and premiums have risen over 120 percent in the past decade for those who do
have coverage. 13 Health insurers engage in an endless list of deceptive, fraudulent, and
unfair practices that deny millions of consumers adequate coverage. Meanwhile, 10 of the
largest health insurers saw their profits balloon from $2.4 billion in 2000 to $13 billion in
2007.14

No single national entity or set of policies governs or guides the health care

system; states divide their responsibilities among multiple agencies, while providers
practicing in the same community and caring for the same patients often work

9

Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability and Health Law, 60 Emory L.J. 277
Randall D. Cebul, James B. Rebitzer, Lowell J. Taylor, and Mark Votruba, “Organizational
Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Health Care System” NBER Working Paper No. 14212 (August
2008) JEL No. D2,I11,I12,I18,IO
11
Julie Barnes, The Many Legal Barriers Standing in the way of Health Care Reform, The Atlantic (March
15, 2012, 9:02 AM ET), reprinted in Bipartisan Policy (Posted March 16, 2012)
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-many-legal-barriers-standing-in-the-way-of-healthcare-reform/254259/
12
David Balto, Make the Market Work for Health Care, Center for American Progress (February 9, 2010)
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/02/market_health_care.html (Supracompetitive
pricing is pricing above what can be sustained in a competitive market . This may be indicative of a business
that has a unique legal or competitive advantage, or possibly of anti -competitive behavior that has driven
competition from the market.)
13
Health Care for America Now, Premiums Soaring in Consolidated Health Insurance Market: Lack of
Competition Hurts Rural States, Small Businesses (2009) available at
http://hcfan.3cdn.net/dadd15782e627e5b75_g9m6isltl.pdf.
14
Id. at 1
10

5

independently from one another. 15 Take this scenerior: A patient tells one nurse she is
allergic to some medicine but the nurse does not communicate this information . The nurse
on the next shift then administers that medicine.16 This example exemplifies the problems
of fragmentation. A broader conception and more of a macro approach to fragmentation
focuses on lack of coordination between different providers that a patient might see for
different illnesses. This might occur if, say, a surgeon used a high-sugar intravenous
therapy after an operation on a diabetic patient without consulting with the diabetic
specialist treating the patient. 17

Fee for service encourages care fragmentation, poor

coordination across different provider settings, and in some instances, unnecessary care
that exposes patients to risk without providing any value to health. 18 Today, chronic disease
accounts for about 75 percent of total health care spending. An acute disease -focused, perintervention model of care delivery and payment cannot address America's current needs. 19
These fragmented organizational structures have led to disrupted relationships, poor
information flows, and misaligned incentives that combine to degrade care quality and
increase costs.20
Providers can improve the method in which they deliver care simply by
increasing the role of information technology and the ability of information to flow
freely across providers. Under the provisions of the PPACA, twenty-two of the sixty-

15

A. Shih, K. Davis, S. Schoenbaum, A. Gauthier, R. Nuzum, and D. McCarthy, Organizing the U.S.
Health Care Delivery System for High Performance, The Commonwealth Fund, August 2008.
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2008/Aug/Organizing-the-U-S--Health-CareDelivery-System-for-High-Performance.aspx
16
Elhauge ed., The Fragmentation in US. Health Care: Cases and Solutions, supra note 8, at 3
17
EIner Id. at 3.
18
Barnes, The Many Legal Barriers Standing in the way of Health Care Reform, supra note 11, at 3
19
Id. at 3
20
Id. at 3

6

five quality measures pertain to “meaningful use” of information technology. 21 This
will not only allow providers to work together, but also allow ACOs to meet additional
quality measures which maybe result in larger shared savings. This ent ails patient
information being available to all providers at the point of care and to patients through
electronic health record systems. 22

Information technology pushes the health care

model in the right direction towards implementing a clear standard of accountability for
the total care of patients. Accessibility to information allows providers accountability to
each other, ability to review each other's work, and collaborate to deliver reliably, high quality, high-value care.
With a seamless flow of information across providers, from insurers to hospital to
physicians, modern information technology offers many tools to facilitate coordination. 23
Physicians exposed to the system had reduced resource utilization and have experienced
fewer unresolved gaps in care.24 Clinical integration is a way for physicians to work
together in a team style environment and collaborate within virtual or physical wall of the
medical center. Previous research and experience has shown that greater care coordination
and integration can lead to higher quality care as well as more efficient care. 25 Clinical

21

Amy K. Fehn, “The importance of Health Information Technology for Accountable Care Organization, The
Atlantic (June 2, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-many-legal-barriers-standing-inthe-way-of-health-care-reform/254259/ (Last Visited 4/29/12).
22
A. Shih, Organizing the U.S. Health Care Delivery System for High Performance, supra note 15
23
Amy K. Fehn, “The importance of Health Information Technology for Accountable Care Organization, supra
note 21.
24
Chernew, Michael E., Allison B. Rosen, and Mark A. Fendrick, Value-Based Insurance Design, Health

Affairs, 26 no. 2 (2007) , pp. 8, (published online January 30,2007),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/2/w195.full.pdf+html.
25

Leighton Ku, Peter Shin, Masha Regenstein and Holly Mead, “Promoting the Integration and Coordination of
Safety-net Health Care Providers Under Health Reform: Key Issues” The Commonwealth Fund (October 13, 2011)
1552 Vol.22
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2011/Oct/1552_Ku_promoting_integ
ration_safetynet_providers_under_reform_ib_v2.pdf
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integration is also the initial platform toward implementing an ACO, the future of
healthcare delivery in America.

On March 23, 2010, Congress passed the Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 26, designed to integrate the model in which
patient care is delivered in Medicare and the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) by
using the ACO model. The Affordable Care Act is in place to improve the quality of health
care services and to lower healthcare costs by encouraging providers to create integrated
health care delivery systems.
B. ACOs
ACOs are collaborations that integrate groups of providers formed from a variety of
entities. These include physicians (particularly primary care physicians), individual
physicians, hospitals, partnerships and others forms of joint-ventures. 27 These providers
work to manage and coordinate care for Medicare and commercial beneficiaries.

A

common feature of successful ACOs will be its ability to connect and synchronize the
interests of the providers, payers and patients. 28 In doing so, these ACOs may receive
shared-saving bonuses from a payer by achieving measured quality targets and

The Affordable Care Act includes several provisions designed to encourage greater coordination and integration
among health care providers, including the promotion of accountable care organizations. Such providers face
particular challenges in coordinating care for their low-income and uninsured patients, and no single approach is
likely to meet their diverse needs. Successful efforts will require federal, state, and local financial resources to
sustain the safety net and make the investments needed to upgrade capabilities. In addition, they will require flexible
strategies that can accommodate variations in community and state needs. These strategies are likely to be adopted
by Medicare and private insurers alike.
26

H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2009-2010); also see
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3590
27
Timony K. Lake, Kate A. Stewart and Paul B. Ginsburg, Lessons from the Field: Making ACOs Real, National
Institute for Health Care Reform, No.2 (Jan. 2011)
28
Elizabeth G. Litten. “ACOs: Getting More for Less?” New Jersey Law Journal Vol. 204- No. 8 (May 23, 2011)
available at http://www.foxrothschild.com/newspubs/newspubsArticle.aspx?id=4294967686 (last visited April 29,
2012)
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demonstrating real reductions in overall spending growth for a defined population of
patients29
The majority of ACO proposals assume that providers within each community will
come together to form these integrated delivery models and solicit other providers in the
community to voluntarily join the ACO. 30 This focus on coordinated patient-centered care
has led to strict requirements which an ACO must satisfy prior to (prior to what?) to be
eligible for the benefits. The following requirements must meet to form ACOs under the
Medicare Shared Savings Program as well as non-Medicare ACOs:
 Define processes to promote the practice of evidence-based medicine and provide
data to evaluate quality and cost measures.
 Build a management and leadership structure that includes administrative and
clinical systems.
 Develop a formal legal structure that allows the organization to receive payments
and distribute shared savings among participating providers.
 Have enough primary care providers to provide care to a minimum of 5,000
Medicare beneficiaries.
 Establishing, reporting, and ensuring compliance with health care quality criteria,
including quality performance standards.
 Contract with a core group of specialist physicians.
 Agree to participate in the program for a minimum of three years 31

29

David Newman, “Accountable Care Organizations and the Medicare Shared Savings Program” Congressional
Research Service (November 4, 2010), pp. 1. (Quoting Aaron McKethan, Mark McClellan, Elliott Fisher, et al.,
Moving from Volume-Driven Medicine Toward Accountable Care, Health Affairs, Health Affairs Blog, August 20,
2009. http://www.healthaffairs.org/blog.) available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41474_20101104.pdf .
30

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Accountable Care Organizations, supra note 3.
Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Saving Program: Accountable
Care Organizations, Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 67 (Thursday April 7, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2011-04-07/pdf/2011-7880.pdf
31

9

ACOs aim to change both the philosophy and practice patterns of providers and in
turn, benefit all patients from the delivery of higher-quality, lower-cost, and better
integrated services. 32 Philosophically, the attention of the health care system changes under
ACOs from the traditional focus on treating patients with truly urgent problems to
preventing those conditions in the first place. On the financial side, ACOs shift away from
paying based on the quantity of services rendered and more toward paying based on the
quality of services. 33 Although ACOs may contract with any payer (Medicare, Medicaid,
or private insurer) to provide services and share in any resulting savings, the results from
this shift are assumed to be far reaching and favorable for the health care delivery system.
Certification of ACOs for participation in the Medicare Shared Savings Program
(MSSP) therefore must qualify under certain performance standards set forth by the Health
and Human Services. 34 Experts expect MSSP will improve growth of integrated delivery
systems, and some experts think as many as 270 ACOs will be created as a result and serve
an estimate of 1-5 million Medicare beneficiaries. 35 To be eligible to participate in the
Shared Savings Program, the ACO must define, establish, implement, and periodically
update processes to promote patient engagement. An ACO must describe in its application
32

Stephen G. Pelletier, ACOs: Controlling Costs While Improving Care, Association of American Medical Colleges
Reporter (February 2011)
https://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/feb11/174756/controlling_costs_while_improving_care.html
33
Barnes, The Many Legal Barriers Standing in the way of Health Care Reform, supra note 11, at 3.
34

Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy
Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Saving Program,
Federal Register, Vol. 76 No. 209 (October 28, 2011) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2011/10/111020aco.pdf (The final Policy Statement differs from the proposed
Policy Statement issued Apr. 19, 2011, in two significant respects. First, the entire final Policy Statement applies to
all providers and provider groups that are eligible to participate in the MSSP regardless if they were formed after
March 23, 2010. Second, MSSP will no longer require a mandatory antitrust review. Nevertheless, Agencies will
continue to protect competition in markets served by ACOs monitoring information collected by CMS concerning
competitive effects of ACOs).
35
Interview by Jennifer Prestigiacomo with Richard Gilfillian, M.D., Director of the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Innovation at CMS, Industry Exclusive: Pioneers in Accountable Care, (January 26, 2012) available at
http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/industry-exclusive-pioneers-accountable-care

10

how it intends to evaluate the health needs of the ACO's assigned population, communicate
clinical knowledge and evidence-based medicine to beneficiaries, engage with beneficiaries
in shared decision-making, provide written standards for beneficiary access and
communication, and establish a process for beneficiaries to access their medical records.

36

C. Best Case Scenario
In evaluating the ACO health care model, ACOs best case scenario guides us in
determining the maximum potential for their success. CMS concludes ACOs would save
Medicare about $1.9 billion between 2012-2014 and drastically improve quality and
efficiency.37 A prime example of the “Best Case Scenario” consists of an ACO in a large
urban area that is competitive with 2 or 3 other ACOs. 38

This ensures equal

competitiveness amongst providers, deeply integrated in information technology and has
prominent primary physicians within its provider. Medicare recipient and commercial
consumer alike benefit alike from this scenario. Providers working together to manage and
coordinate care allows consumers to take advantage of the option to select from identical
care that is of the utmost quality. Several supporters of ACOs point to Kaiser Permanente

36

Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Saving Program Accountable
Care Organizations, Federal Register, Vol. 76 No. 212 (Wednesday, Nov. 2, 2011) available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-02/pdf/2011-27461.pdf (This final rule contains provisions relating to
Medicare payments to providers of services and suppliers participating in ACOs under the Medicare Shared Savings
Program. Providers can continue to receive traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) payments and be eligible for
additional payments if they meet specified quality requirements)
37
David Hogberg, Your Health care in 429 Easy-to-Read Pages!, Investors Business Daily Blog (April 1,2011,
2:44pm), http://blogs.investors.com/capitalhill/index.php/home/35-politicsinvesting/2552-your-health-care-in-429easy-to-read-pages
38
Press Release, United States Census Bureau, Growth in Urban Pop. Outpaces Rest of Nation,(March, 26, 2012)
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html (The nation's urban population
increased by 12.1 percent from 2000 to 2010, outpacing the nation's overall growth rate of 9.7 percent for the same
period, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Urban areas — defined as densely developed residential, commercial
and other nonresidential areas -- now account for 80.7 percent of the U.S. population, up from 79.0 percent in 2000.
Although the rural population -- the population in any areas outside of those classified as “urban” — grew by a
modest amount from 2000 to 2010, it continued to decline as a percentage of the national population.)
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and Healthcare Partner Medical Group as notable examples of the success and potential of
ACO type models. 39 At Kaiser Permanente, providers have cut the number of senior visits
by about 40 percent by delivering team care to them, and identifying all the seniors at high
risk and making sure they get the right prescriptions, the right follow -up and the right
coaching.40

This type of harmonization saves hundreds of millions of dollars a year.

Although neither anticipates joining the MSSP, both provider groups currently have the
level of integration and coordination that will be established by ACOs. 41
III.

Road Block to Integration
However, because most Medicare ACOs serve private insurers as well, provider

dominance concerns in negotiations may raise a valid anticompetitive claim under antitrust
law. These anticompetitive concerns result from both horizontal and vertical integration. 42
Such concentration is significant because, with health insurance in the picture, consumers
must be mindful that the expect savings from ACOs is dependent on perfect competition.
An organization integrates horizontally or vertically when it enters the new market as a
competitor, and the increase market presence create the required competition. Horizontal

39

James C. Robinson and Emma L. Dolan, Accountable Care Organizations in California: Lessons for the National
Debate on Delivery System Reform, Integrated Healthcare Assc. White Paper (2010) ACOs in California care
for 15.7 million prepaid enrollees covered by commercial HMO, Medicare, and Medicaid managed care, plus
numerous Medicare fee-for-service enrollees. Kaiser Permanente is the most successful ACO in California. In
California, approximately 56% of individuals with commercial insurance, 45% of Medicare beneficiaries, and 52%
of Medicaid beneficiaries receive their care from an ACO, collectively these account for 54% of all persons with
health insurance in the state. California’s provider organizations span a wide spectrum of sizes and structures, from
the fully integrated Kaiser Permanente with 6.7 million enrollees to small medical groups and IPAs, some with
fewer than 5,000 patients.
40
Interview by Joanne Silberner with George Halverson, CEO, Kaiser Permanente, Head of Major HMO Sees
Opening for ACOs, Kaiser Health News (July 25, 2011),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/July/25/halvorson-Q-and-A-kaiser-permanente-accountable-careorganizations.aspx (last Visited 3/29/12)
41
Press Release, Kaiser Permanente, 2011 Aon Hewitt Value Initiative Benchmarking Study, (March 2011)
available at https://brokernet.kp.org/broker/wcm/connect/704ae100482fc6a681369fcc62f09f01/CO -Healthcare-reform-ACO.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&lmod=725315576 (Last Visited 3/29/12)
42
Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distributor, Inc. 475 F.Supp. 973(D. Mass 1979)

12

integration is partnering of providers with other providers across the same or similar level
within the healthcare field 43, for example when a cardiologist and an urologist combine
services to provide more uniform care. Conversely, vertical integration is the partnering of
healthcare organizations that provide some service in the supply chain to the healthcare
industry, for example insurance companies teaming up with hospitals and providers to
improve quality. Although vertical integration is not prohibited per se, vertical integration
may be unlawful under Sherman Act if it creates monopoly power and is accompanied by
intent to exclude competition.44
Although antitrust laws permit integration, these network structures create a vehicle
for troubling concerns. 45 Particularly ACOs run the risk of price fixing, engaging in joint
price negotiations, and they may be able to exercise extreme market power particularly in
rural markets. 46 Market power measures the degree to which an organization has the ability
to raise prices or exclude rivals. As with other industries, the laws of market power and its
impact on competition affect the health care system. Several studies show that prices go up
in markets where large healthcare organizations have amassed substantial mark et power. 47

43

Laura Summer, M.P.H. , Integration, Concentration and Competition in Provider Marketplace, Academy Health
Brief http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/AH_R_Integration%20FINAL2.pdf (Horizontal integration
refers to the consolidation of two or more organizations fulfilling the same roles within a single industry – e.g.
hospital mergers or mergers among different physician groups.)
44
Sherman Antitrust Act, § 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Vertical integration involves participants who are not
direct competitors because they are at different levels. These participants are from one or more provi ders,
hospitals, and insurers. This distinction under the Sherman Act becomes significant in determining whether
to apply a per se rule of illegality or the Rule of Reason. Vertical integration is typically subject to the ruleof-reason test.)
45
GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 329 F.Supp 823 (S.D.N.Y 1971)
46
J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Remarks at the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum Washington,
DC, FTC Care Organizations: What Exactly are We Getting?” (November 17,2011)(transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/111117fallforumspeech.pdf)
47
America’s Health Insurance Plans Coverage, Accountable Care Organizations and Market Power Issues
(October, 2010), as reprinted in http://www.ahipcoverage.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/AC-Summary04.15.2011.pdf
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This problem increases with respect to negotiations with private payers because , unlike
Medicare sets their own rates, leaving patients powerless against joint venture providers. 48
Furthermore, any decline in savings from the Medicare Shared Saving Program will simply
be passed on to the commercial payer and subsequently increase the market share and
power of the provider. 49
The potential draw backs of ACOs,, the worst-case scenario, involve their potential
to harm our nation’s healthcare industry. Critics like Tim Greaney, and even some
supporters, concur that large amounts of collaboration produce a wave of regional
consolidations among providers that would locate around large hospitals and become
monopolies or duopolies that increase, rather than decrease, cost. 50 Rural areas illustrate
such an example, with only a single quality hospital and a large service area.

Th ese

providers choose the primary physicians and the clientele as well as set prices to the level
that benefits the ACO the most.

Instances such as this give the dominant provider

essentially the ability to cherry pick practices and patient panels that will be able to yield
the greatest investment in value and will receive the greatest benefit from the ACO
arrangement. 51 Another scenario involves the provider as simply the better organization
and naturally forces out competitors within its service area. Federal antitrust laws, like
Sherman Act, do not penalize efficient monopolies or natural monopolies so private
patients and insurers might end up paying more because the new, larger organizations
48
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would inhibit competition.52

Without other ACOs acting to force rivalries among

providers, or between them and other networks in the market, large ACOs may entrench
market power in any of the provider markets. If the ACO movement contributes to market
dominance by large providers, it is counterproductive to the entire premise and any benefit
is lost.53
Empirical studies show the viability of that scenario and suggest that health care
reform legislation has already prompted a number of mergers among health care
providers.54 Furthermore, a substantial body of economic evidence indicates that market
concentration has been a major factor spurring escalation in the cost of health insurance.
Studies show that hospital consolidation in the 1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at
least 5%, and by 40% or more when merging hospitals were located close to one another. 55
Furthermore, a study undertaken by the Massachusetts Attorney General showed delivery
costs were driven largely by hospitals and physician groups market dominance, not by
quality or cost of providing care. 56
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In spite of the upsides to the ACO, providers must be aware of the potential for
antitrust litigation to slow down or even block integration in some instances. Private suits
are less of a concern to ACOs because individual plaintiffs have a more difficult time, at
large, proving key elements of an antitrust violation. 57

In order to prove an antitrust

violation, the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence that they suffered an injury to their
“business or property,” actual harm or damage in fact, proximate cause and scienter. 58 The
most difficult of the elements to prove is actual harm and scienter. 59 For example, in April
2010, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied class certification in an
antitrust action against the January 2000 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation’s
acquisition of Highland Park Hospital, ruling that the plaintiffs did not prove “common
impact.”60 Nonetheless, ACO are susceptible to numerous amounts of frivolous lawsuits
that could delay integration.
On the other hand, federal investigations pressure the ACOs. Doctors, hospitals,
insurance companies and drug manufacturers will be running huge legal risks if they get
together and agree on a strategy that involves negotiation of prices and reduces the growth
of health spending. 61 Furthermore, in a recent letter to the Senate Finance Committee, the
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American Hospital Association said uncertainty about enforcement of the antitrust laws
“makes it difficult for a hospital and doctors to collaborate to improve care” and lower
costs.62 The threat of a Federal Investigation, signifies the realization that the ACO is about
to embark on a lengthy legal process resulting in years of legal problems. Although not an
analogous business, Microsoft Corporation faced identical antitrust investigations in the
1990′s and the results were damaging for the software giant. 63

A similar lengthy

investigation could be devastating to ACO and the modernization of the health care
delivery system in America.
In order to sort out effectuated and continual mergers facilitated by encouragement
of ACOs, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), working with the FTC
(which has announced a final policy statement regulating of ACOs both within the means
of the Shared Savings Program as well as in commercial markets), can take a number of
steps to reduce the risk of anticompetitive effects.

IV.

Protection of Clinical Integration
The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of

Justice (the “Agencies”) recognize that ACOs could reduce competition and harm
consumers through enormous bargaining power which would result in higher prices and
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lower quality of care. 64 Pursuant to these concerns, the Agencies released enforcement
policies addressing federal antitrust uncertainties and ensuring that ACOs have an
opportunity to achieve maximum efficiency while protecting patients from potential
anticompetitive harm. In order to strike a balance among the providers to encourage the
formation of ACOs while avoiding service area dominance, the Agencies set forth safety
zones in which providers can facilitate with little to no challenge or agency review. 65
Despite these concerns by the DOJ and FTC, those ACOs falling into an exemption
or comply with the FTC guidelines avoid a mandatory review and are only subject to
voluntary disclosure.

The significant feature of voluntary disclosure consists of

transparency and accessibility of information regarding costs and quality to consumers and
regulators.

This ability to monitor, share, and publicize statistical data, improves

competition and provide clearance for ACO to operate within several of the FTC safe
harbors.66
An ACOs falls within the safety zone if the participants combine common service
share is 30% or less within their Primary Service Area (PSA) and does not raise concerns
of exclusivity. 67 Because exclusivity increases the likelihood of an ACO being able to gain
provider dominance and exercise market power, regulators must be aware of these
characteristics when determining whether an ACO sufficiently fulfills the safe harbor
64
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requirement. This safe harbor from mandatory review protects any service provided in PSA
including physician specialties, major diagnostics, in & out patient facilities. The PSA is a
screening mechanism used by the FTC and DOJ which constitutes the relevant antitrust
geographic market, with the intention to evaluate potential competitive problems within a
region. Joint ventures with low PSA shares reflect a low risk of an ACO being able to
exercise market power and produce anticompetitive fears, while high PSA shares indicate a
likelihood of an ACO having exclusivity, market power and ability to drive up prices.
Thus, the agencies agree that ACOs with less than 30% PSA shares are unlikely to raise
any anticompetitive concerns. 68
The Agencies agree that through incorporation of the final version of the Policy
Statement, that ACOs will not be challenged if classified under a safety zone and will,
therefore, no longer require mandatory review, absent extraordinary circumstances.
Nevertheless, any ACO that exceeds 50% of the PSA threshold risks mandatory review,
with a few exceptions. These exceptions are as follows: first, rural providers who include
only 1 physician group practice per specialty for each county that contains at leas t “isolated
rural” zip code, and secondly dominant provider’s limitation, which encompasses ACO’s
that exceeds 50% but there are no other ACO providers to compete with within the PSA .69
On the other hand, there are ACOs on the spectrum that fall outside th e safety zone
but below the mandatory review levels of 50%. The FTC developed a list identifying high
market power behavior that would subject ACOs to particular level of scrutiny. ACOs can
significantly avoid the likelihood of an investigation by: (1) forcing private payers (i.e.,
insurance companies) to purchase services exclusively from the ACO by restricting their
68
69
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ability to steer patients to certain providers, such as providers outside the ACO; (2) tying
sales of ACO services to sales of non-ACO services, such as requiring private payers to
buy non-ACO services from an affiliate of an ACO participant as a condition of being able
to buy ACO services; (3) requiring ACO participants to participate exclusively in the ACO
(rather than having the ability to contract with insurance companies outside the ACO
umbrella); and (4) telling insurance companies that they cannot distribute information
about the ACO’s costs and quality of care to health plan enrollees. 70
The FTC and DOJ however, apply “rule of reason” analysis to any ACO
participating in the MSSP because the agencies recognize that organizations meeting the
MSSP eligibility requirements within a safety zone are likely to be bona fide arrangements
intended to improve healthcare quality and costs through collaboration. 71 Under the rule of
reason analysis, anti-competitive effects of collective negotiations weigh against pro competitive efficiencies that result from concerted activities among provider network
members (e.g., cost savings and quality improvement).72

Without a rule of reason

analysis, collective negotiations and fee agreements are per se illegal under the antitrust
laws.73 Furthermore, the rule of reason applies equally to joint ventures that accommodate
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commercial payors, as long as provider maintains the requisite governance structure and
clinical process similar to that employed in the MSSP.

V.

Dynamic Scenario
Despite these safeguards provided by the Agencies, excessive market power remains

obtainable by ACOs, and counteract the objective of market defragmentation

In

encouraging participants to collaborate by incentivizing care providers to join forces,
consolidation in the forms of mergers, joint ventures, and alliances undoubtedly exacerbate
anti-competitive concerns. Furthermore, a substantial body of economic evidence indicates
that market concentration has been a major factor spurring escalation in the cost of health
insurance.74 Studies show that hospital consolidation in the 1990s raised overall inpatient
prices by at least 5%, and by 40% or more when merging hospitals were located close to
one another. 75
ACOs ustilize a 3 year contract 76, in which providers must abide by the regulations
and performance measures set forth by the ACA and CMS, but the long term effects of
ACOs are still unknown. How much enforcement power will federal safe harbors have on
ACO market dominance 10 years down the road? The dynamic scenario analysis attempts
to illustrate the effects changes in the environment will have on the model outcome. Just
as the potential exists for ACOs to naturally become anti-competitive, the same potential
74
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exists for driving up prices and lowering the quality of care as dominate providers that are
per se anti-competitive or subject to mandatory FTC review. However, that antitrus t laws
do not reach every corporation or entity that has attained a dominant position in the
marketplace by simply being the best, or even just by being lucky. Antitrust laws intend to
promote and protect robust competition, not to punish big companies merely on account of
their size, nor have antitrust laws ever been anti-market or anti-business in their underlying
conception.77 Ultimately, antitrust issues occur and subsequently investigated when buyers
or sellers, more so in the case of sellers than buyers, raise prices as a result of a merger in a
narrowly defined market. 78 In defining these relevant markets, the Agencies focus primarily
on the alternatives available to consumers in the face of a decrease in the price paid by a
hypothetical monopsonist. 79 The commentary to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
specified horizontal mergers are likely to lessen competition substantially through
coordinated interaction if it creates likelihood that, after the merger, competitors would
coordinate their pricing or other competitive actions, or would coordinate them more
completely or successfully than before the merger. 80
An ACO achieves market dominance despite the FTC safe harbors in several
scenarios. The first scenario centers on the idea of natural competition, an objective at the
heart of PPACA and the objective in including ACOs in the passage of the Congressional
Bill. Competition embodies the concept that poorly run companies are forced out of
77
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business. The result of natural competition causes fixed cost of services to become so high
that it is not profitable for a second firm to enter and compete. 81 An established smallscale organization or large-scale organization trying to break into the service area lacks
efficiency and ultimately fails because competition has had an adverse effect. The quality
measures which PPACA wishes to impose on providers in order to facilitate transparency
and promote integration contribute to this problem, having a negative effect on competition
within a PSA.

The availability of information to the public regarding CMS quality

measures, performance and other data potentially leads to patients choosing the higher
quality ACO over the less prominent. This possibility allows the dominant provider to
raise prices and enforce bargaining power because that specific ACO knows individual
patients will choose them over other less prominent ACOs.
A second scenario involves the concept of “Too big to fail.” ACOs concentrate more
and more power in fewer organizations, allowing them to become “Too big to fail.” 82 These
large groups of providers classified as “too big to fail” will have increased leverage with
payers; or, without effective competition, they receive little incentive to reduce spending or
improve quality of care. 83 Eligibility requirements suggest they favor larger more complex
organizations and place a burden on small to mid-size practices. Groups of independent
practitioners as well as other types of small and mid-sized practices may lack the
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infrastructure, Internet technology, or other resources needed to qualify and succeed on
their own. Also, smaller, entrepreneurial organizations that want to venture alone may find
themselves competing against similar physicians’ practices that have joined ACOs or have
been acquired by larger organizations and as a result, will be under less financial and
clinical pressure to improve efficiency and quality than the smaller newcomer.84

VI.

Why Preemption is an inferior protection
Although PPACA appears to achieve the benefits it has advanced for Medicare and

its beneficiaries by means of vertical integration, it inevitably invites horizontal integration
that creates new market power in private markets. ACOs, therefore, should be subject to
close antitrust scrutiny. 85 With these relaxed enforcement guidelines, including safety
zones, the possibility of ACOs gaining exceptional market power could be apparent only
several years after inception. Are patients then left powerless, subject to the will of the
provider and deprived of any remedy?

Opponents of state intervention support their

position by the fact that states seldom bring anticompetitive actions and only rarely file
consumer protection actions. 86 In six of the seven service areas with a market concentration
of health insurers, no significant consumer action was taken against health insurers. 87 State
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laws fail to rise to the level of substitutes for federal antitrust and consumer protection
laws.88
Congress, however, directly or indirectly addressed this concern when drafting the
preemption laws of the ACA. HHS clarified that ACOs are not preempting any state laws
or state law requirements and “to the extent that State law affects an ACO's operations, we
expect the ACO to comply with those requirements as an entity authorized to conduct
business in the State. These preemption provisions set a federal floor under which state
law cannot go. “We do not believe it is necessary to make ACOs attest to do what they
otherwise would be required to do under State law.” 89 Hence, federal laws supercede state
laws below the standards or which set lower standards than those established in PPACA.
This drafting of the preemption clause allows the states’ laws to supplement, duplicate and
even strengthen federal law to the States particular liking. 90 State power, essentially,
protects the rights of its patients and provides the overall best chance of success for ACOs
within its borders. State enforcement plays an important role in improving the quality of
health care services and lowering health care costs by encouraging integrated health care
systems.91
In addition to congressional intent, the Supreme Court held in Parker v. Brown, that
states have the ability to grant immunity as a defense to parties in violation of federal
antitrust claims as long as the parties are acting (1) pursuant to clear articulated and
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affirmatively expressed state policy and (2) that the state is engaged in the active
supervision of the conduct. 92 If states have the ability to grant immunity, they likewise
retain power to restrict conduct and impose more severe regulations that are required under
the federal safe harbors.
Private antitrust lawsuits and State antitrust claims provide a second level of
protection against ACOs that can qualify for a safety zone and subject ACOs to a
heightened level of scrutiny far more burdensome than federal law. With regards to State
lawsuits, State Attorney Generals (AG) bear the authority to enforce federal and state
antitrust laws. State AGs have merger enforcement authority under their state antitrust
statutes and under the Clayton Act. 93 Typically, states investigating a matter arising under
the federal antitrust laws jointly investigate with either the DOJ or the FTC, or they
conduct a separate investigation. 94 In addition, state attorneys general retain authority to
seek restitution on behalf of the citizens of their states that have been harmed as a result of
violations of either the federal or state antitrust laws.

95

State antitrust enforcement

generally focuses on the interests of consumers and the proprietary interests of the states.
Generally, state attorneys general possess the authority to protect the state’s consumers, the
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state’s proprietary interests, and the general welfare and economy of the state.

96

The bulk

of the State’s involvement deals with local price-fixing, price maintenance and mergers of
entities dealing specifically with public establishments. 97 The Supreme Court in California
v. American Stores Co. 98 and lower federal courts in other cases, recognized that antitrust
enforcement decisions by federal officials do not preclude state enforcers from taking a
entirely different course of action. 99 Professor Casalino, a strong proponent of ACOs,
recommends the Agencies use antitrust regulations to weed out sham organizations , who
are trying to obtain the benefits of MSSP without complying with CMS, or well-meaning
incompetent organizations that are certain to fail. 100
Over recent years, there have been several cases in which States took charge and
filed antitrust claims, particularly in the context of healthcare mergers, despite the lack of
federal involvement. One case in particular, California v. Sutter Health Care Sys.,
demonstrated a joint investigation between the FTC and State officials may arrive at
completely different conclusions moving forth with the matter. 101 The Attorney General
decided to pursue the claim challenging hospital mergers and successfully did so.
Similarly, in New York after investigation by the DOJ antitrust division produced no
action, the State Attorney General successfully unwinded a price-fixing arrangement
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between New York hospitals. 102 As with the case of ACOs, federal antitrust authorities
declined to take action in investigating and pursuing mergers of service providers who
meet the MSSP criteria and fall within the safe harbors.
The ability for States to play a vital role in the antitrust enforcement shines through
in the passage of past bills of legislation. In enacting the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, which
granted States the power to seek monetary relief as well as injunctive relief, congress
envisioned

that

states

would

supplement

federal

antitrust

efforts

by

tackling

anticompetitive practices in areas the federal government had neither the resources nor the
expertise to investigate.

103

The support of state involvement serves as recognition that the

States have different levels of concern and focus than their federal counterparts. Although
consolidation of providers to form ACO in a specific rural region might not have an overall
effect on the health care market at a federal level, individual citizens of a State might be
burdened. Without such action by the State Attorney Generals, ACOs retain excessive
market power, creating hardships, and defeating the objectives of ACOs. Additionally state
antitrust laws assist because the FTC and DOJ possess limited resources to investigate
every formation of an ACO and determine if, despite falling in a safe harbor the ACO is
still exhibiting pro-competitive effects. For example, if the FTC exhibits the
competitiveness of large scale Hospitals (A) and (B), the FTC might decide that, based on
constraints, it cannot look into the competitive restraints of smaller more local concerns. 104
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The DOJ or FTC might decide not to bring a challenge or a complaint because they deem
the matter too local or otherwise small in scope to expend the federal government’s limited
resources.105
CONCLUSION
ACOs possess the potential to remedy the problem of fragmentation within the
United States health care system and reduce cost across the board for Medicare
beneficiaries and private consumers alike. However, these potential benefits carry with
then the associated risk of ACOs obtaining excessive market power, despite potentially
qualifying for a federal safe harbor. Antitrust experts express a concern especially when
pertaining to consolidation and pooling of funds and/or risks occurring on a horizontal
level.

As this paper reflects, outcomes that might be efficient when ACOs are first

established or during their first three years contract might not produce the desired result
years down the road. This concern stands out in areas where there is only one provider for
service a large area or in the case where one superior ACO surpasses all competitors ,
eligibility criteria identified by CMS, and becomes known as the provider everyone wants
to use.

In either instance, the ACO retains the ability to negotiate substantial price

increases, block competition and cause competitive harms that disrupt the benefits that
PPACA can provide to the uninsured, underinsured and private consumers of the United
States.
Competition serves as the driving force of the marketplace and ensures consumers
are adequately protected; health care markets are at their most efficient when competition
4724&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3DRatner,%20J%20Conflicting%20Federal%20and%20State%20Enforcement%20of%20Federal%20Antitrust%20Law.pdf
105
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prevails. State involvement assists in accomplishing a significant health care reform. With
no clear supremacy clause regarding state enforcement of antitrust laws, PPACA has
provided an opportunity for States to strengthen antitrust protection against ACOs that
might potential raise anticompetitive concerns. In addition to the oversight of CMS, HHS
and FTC, State enforcers continue to function as a legitimate second level of safeguard to
give ACOs the best chance of success. Subjecting providers to stronger antitrust scrutiny
and enforcement of fraud will provide a necessary check on the negative effects that could
result from ACO formation years down the road.
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